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his cave; in Williams he has tamed the dragon and made him a useful
animal.
Guy Holdridge
SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF INTERPRETATION ARISING OUT OF PROCEDURE
FOR LEVYING SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS
Nine property owners petitioned to have their properties stricken
from an ordinance' assessing each lot for street improvements in propor-
tion to the frontage it bore to all of the abutting lots.2 The plaintiffs
contended that the ordinance resulted in excessive assessments against
their properties which caused them to pay a disproportionately larger
share of the cost of the improvements than other citizens of Baton Rouge
to whose general benefit these improvements accrued. After the trial
court denied relief, the First Circuit Court of Appeal reversed and or-
dered that the respective properties be deleted from the assessment ordi-
nance. 3 On appeal, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed and held
that although the council received no evidence on the issue of propor-
tional benefit, the statement in the council's resolution and assessment
ordinance which recited that "each lot or parcel of real estate to be as-
sessed will be benefited to an amount not less than the proposed local or
special assessment" was a sufficient compliance with the statutory provi-
sions concerning the requisite benefits determination. The court further
concluded that one may not protest that a legislative body has not done
what a resolution and/or ordinance proclaims that it has done, and that
the council's determination of benefits was a legislative act that may not
be upset absent a manifest abuse of power exceeding limits of legislative
1. Local or Special Assessment Ordinance No. 4047 was adopted by the East Baton
Rouge Parish Council on June 27, 1973, assessing property adjacent to North Street in the
City of Baton Rouge for construction of improvements along North Street. This assess-
ment ordinance purported to assess the plaintiffs' property in accordance with LA. R.S.
33:3301-3319 (1950).
2. These properties are located adjacent to North Street in the City of Baton Rouge.
Before the improvements North Street was a two-lane asphalt street, bordered by side-
walks, street lights, and underground drainage. With the improvements it became a four-
lane concrete street bordered by wide sidwalks, underground conduits for street lighting,
improved drainage, and tree wells for plantings. Landry v. Parish of East Baton Rouge,
343 So. 2d 207, 210 (La. App. Ist Cir.), rev'd, 352 So. 2d 656 (La. 1977).
3. Landry v. Parish of East Baton Rouge, 343 So. 2d 207 (La. App. Ist Cir.), rev'd,
352 So. 2d 656 (La. 1977).
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discretion. 4 Landry v. Parish of East Baton Rouge, 352 So. 2d 656 (La.
1977).
Under title 33, section 3301 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes, mu-
nicipalities are authorized to improve streets and may levy local or spe-
cial assessments on the real property abutting the improvements to
defray their total cost.5 Upon completion of the contract, the municipal-
ity must require from the engineer of the municipality a duly certified
statement, showing in detail the total cost of the improvements in the
proportion that their frontage bears to all abutting lots.6 Upon receipt
of the engineer's certified statement, the governing authority of the mu-
nicipality is required to review the statement, including the proposed as-
sessment, and to determine whether each parcel of real estate will be
benefited to an amount not less than the proposed assessment.
7
4. The court was also faced with the council's contention that plaintiffs' lawsuit had
prescribed. The council argued that prescription began to run on May 8, 1973, the date
Resolution No. 10,274 was published. The court concluded that the plaintiffs did not con-
test the authority of the council to order the improvements, but were contesting the validity
of Resolution No. 10,413 of May 9, 1973, and Assessment Ordinance No. 4047 of June 27,
1973. The former was not published until July 12, 1973 and the latter until September 6,
1973. Accordingly, plaintiffs' lawsuit filed on July 17, 1973 was not later than thirty days
from the date the Resolution (10,413) or the Ordinance (4047) was published, the time limit
set by LA. R.S. 33:3319 (Supp. 1958).
5. The requisite procedures to prepare and enact an assessment ordinance include the
adoption of a resolution giving notice of the municipality's intention to make the proposed
assessments, and the holding of an open session to hear all objections to the proposed
improvements, the manner of paying for them, and the manner in which the improvements
shall be made (LA. R.S. 33:3302 (Supp. 1970)); an ordering of the construction of the im-
provements, publication of the notice of intention, preparation of plans and specifications,
advertising for bids (LA. R.S. 33:3303 (1950)); and awarding of the contract (LA. R.S.
33:3304 (Supp. 1956)).
6. LA. R.S. 33:3305 (Supp. 1956).
7. LA. R.S. 33:3306(A) (Supp. 1970) provides:
Upon receipt of the certified statement or report of the engineer as provided for in
the preceding section, the governing authority shall review said certified statement or
report, including the proposed local or special assessments, and thereafter shall make
a determination as to whether each lot or parcel of real estate to be assessed will be
benefited to an amount not less than the proposed local or special assessment . ...
(Emphasis added.)
Following the review and benefits determination, notice concerning the proposed as-
sessment and the method of payment required must be mailed to each property owner to be
assessed. LA. R.S. 33:3306(B) (Supp. 1970). After proper notice is given, the governing
authority is permitted to adopt an ordinance levying a local or special assessment on each
lot of real estate abutting the improved street. LA. R.S. 33:3306(C) (Supp. 1970). The
municipality may participate in the payment of the total costs in the manner and to the
extent that the governing authority of the municipality may determine. LA. R.S. 33:3318
(Supp. 1958).
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Before section 3306 of title 33 was amended in 1970, it permitted the
governing authority of a municipality to adopt an ordinance levying a
special assessment on property "in proportion that its frontage bears to
all the abutting lots or parcels of real estate to be improved."' 8 This
statute was commonly called the "front foot" rule. Prior to the statute's
amendment, it was well-settled that the total burden of local public im-
provements could be placed on the abutting property owners.9 Appor-
tionment of the entire cost of a street improvement could be made
without inquiring about any special benefit to the individual owners10
even though the amount of the assessment exceeded the value of the
property. 1 I
The 1970 amendment to the statute now requires that each individ-
ual lot which is to be assessed be benefited to an amount not less than the
proposed assessment.12 In adopting the amendment, the legislature in-
tended that municipal governing authorities deviate from the policy of
imposing assessments without consideration of a cost-benefit ratio to a
fairer and more equitable policy which mandates that the assessing au-
thority determine the benefit to each lot abutting an improvement.
In the instant case, plaintiffs sought relief under section 3306 to have
their respective properties stricken from the assessment ordinance.
Plaintiffs contended that the Parish Council had failed to comply with
statutory requirements in enacting the assessment ordinance because it
was without sufficient facts and information to make the requisite deter-
uination of benefits to each assessed lot and thus had acted arbitrarily
and capriciously.13 The court concluded that the Parish Council's deter-
8. See, e.g., City of Shreveport v. Weiner, 134 La. 800, 64 So. 718 (1914).
9. City of Alexandria v. Chicago, Rock Island and Pac. R.R., 240 La. 1025, 126 So.
2d 351 (1961); Palmer v. Mayor of Ponchatoula, 195 La. 997, 197 So. 697 (1940); Donald-
son's Heirs v. City of New Orleans, 166 La. 1059, 118 So. 134 (1928).
10. City of Shreveport v. Shreveport Transit Co., 134 La. 568, 64 So. 414 (1914); Kelly
v. Chadwick, 104 La. 719, 29 So. 295 (1901), afd sub. nom. Chadwick v. Kelly, 187 U.S.
540 (1902).
11. The imposition of such an assessment pursuant to the front foot rule and without
inquiry into benefits has been held not to constitute a taking of property without due proc-
ess of law. See the cases cited in note 9, supra.
12. See LA. R.S. 33:3306(A) (Supp. 1970), supra note 7.
13. Plaintiffs relied upon Brill v. The City of Grand Rapids, 383 Mich. 216, 174 N.W.
832 (1970), wherein the Michigan Supreme Court held that a widening of a twenty-foot
wide paved blacktop street in a residential district to a "through" street of forty-five foot
paved width for accommodation of heavier traffic did not specially benefit the adjacent
property so as to justify the assessment. In the instant case, plaintiffs contended that, as in
Brill, the improvements did not benefit them so as to justify the assessment. However, the
court distinguished Brill from the instant case by stating:
While there was an upgrading and widening of an already paved North Street as
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mination of whether the abutting properties would be benefited to an
amount not less than the proposed assessment involved a legislative
function' 4 "with admitted quasi-judicial overtones," as distinguished
from a judicial function. Thus, the special assessment was allowed to
stand in spite of the fact that the property owners had not been given the
opportunity to be heard prior to the final administrative action. The
court also concluded that the failure of the council to receive any evi-
dence correlating specific monetary enhancement of the property with
the cost of the street improvements did not exceed the limits of its legisla-
tive discretion.
An analysis of the traditionally recognized distinction in administra-
tive law between legislation and adjudication serves as a basis for assess-
ing the validity of the court's conclusion that the benefits determination
involved a legislative function. Historically, determining whether pro-
cedural due process requirements apply to the administrative process has
been based upon the distinction between legislative and judicial func-
tions.' 5 If legislation, or rule-making, is involved, "there is no constitu-
an integral part of downtown improvements in Baton Rouge, the purpose was not, as
in Brill, to accommodate heavier traffic of a 'through' nature, nor had the character of
a little traversed residential neighborhood been changed to that of a major thorough-
fare or highway.
352 So. 2d at 660.
It is not out of place to inquire whether the court in Landry properly understood the
effect of the improvements of North Street. It is imperative to point out that North Street
is one of only two exits from Interstate 110, north-bound, that leads directly into the central
business district of Baton Rouge. For many years before the improvement of North Street,
the flow of traffic into the central business district could be accommodated by the Conven-
tion Street exit as it was the most expeditious route to most of the major buildings. How-
ever, with the recent construction of several large buildings directly adjacent to North
Street, its character was drastically changed. With new construction came heavier traffic
flow and the need to improve access to the expanded downtown facilities. The improve-
ments on North Street accommodate this need. The improvements are for the benefit of
all those persons who must use North Street to reach employment-related, governmental,
and commercial destinations situated adjacent to North Street.
14. By concluding that the council's benefits determination was a legislative act, the
court created an anomalous situation. Plaintiffs argued that Brill v. The City of Grand
Rapids supported their position that the widening of a previously predominantly residen-
tial street did not specially benefit them so as to justify the assessment. With respect to this
contention, Justice Calogero, writing for the majority, concluded that Brill was not disposi-
tive of the instant case. Such a conclusion was in itself adjudication.
15. This distinction between legislative and judicial functions is what the United States
Supreme Court has called the "recognized distinction in administrative law between pro-
ceedings for the purpose of promulgating policy-type rules or standards, on the one hand,
and proceedings designed to adjudicate disputed facts in particular cases on the other."
United States v. Florida East Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 245 (1973).
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tional right to any hearing whatsoever,"16 because the courts see the
administrative exercise of legislative power as similar to the direct exer-
cise of power by the legislature. If, however, a judicial or adjudicative
function is involved, an analogy to the judicial process is made and an
adherence to the procedural safeguards of due process 17 is required.
The basic distinction between rule-making and adjudication is best
illustrated by the United States Supreme Court's treatment of two re-
lated cases under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
In Londoner v. Denver, is the Supreme Court held that due process had
not been accorded a property owner who objected to an assessment
against his property. Although the property owner was allowed to file a
written complaint and objection, he was not heard orally. The Court
concluded that due process of law required that the property owner
"have the right to support his allegations by argument, however brief;
and, if need be, by proof, however informal."' 9 Furthermore, the Court
concluded that the opportunity to be heard must be afforded before the
tax becomes irrevocably fixed.
Seven years later, in the case of Bi-Metaffic Co. v. Colorado,20 the
Court sustained an order of the State Board of Equalization increasing
the valuation of all taxable property in Denver by a substantial percent-
age, although no opportunity was given to the affected taxpayers to be
heard before the assessments became irrevocably fixed. The Court anal-
ogized the agency's action to the direct exercise of power by the legisla-
ture.21 Justice Holmes for the majority distinguished Londoner by
noting that in the earlier case "[a] relatively small number of persons was
16. Willapoint Oysters v. Ewing, 174 F.2d 676, 693 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S.
860 (1949).
17. See F. COOPER, THE LAWYER AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 80-84 (1957); 1 K.
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 7.03, 8.04 (1958).
18. 210 U.S. 373 (1908).
19. Id. at 386.
20. 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
21. Justice Holmes, speaking for the Court, stated:
Where a rule of conduct applies to more than a few people it is impracticable that
everyone should have a direct voice in its adoption. The Constitution does not re-
quire all public acts to be done in town meeting or an assembly of the whole. General
statutes within the state power are passed that affect the person or property of individ-
uals, sometimes to the point of ruin, without giving them a chance to be heard. Their
rights are protected in the only way that they can be in a complex society, by their
power, immediate or remote, over those who make the rule. If the result in this case
had been reached as it might have been by the State's doubling the rate of taxation, no
one would suggest that the Fourteenth Amendment was violated unless every person
affected had been allowed an opportunity to raise his voice against it.
239 U.S. at 445.
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concerned, who Were exceptionally affected, in each case upon individ-
ual grounds," 22 whereas Bi-Metalic was a case "dealing only with the
principle upon which all the assessments in the county had been laid."' 23
Thus, whether a party must be afforded an opportunity for a hear-
ing to meet and to present evidence depends upon a distinction between
adjudicative or legislative facts:
Adjudicative facts are the facts about the parties and their activities,
businesses and properties. Adjudicative facts usually answer the
questions of who did what, where, when, how, why, with what mo-
tive or intent; adjudicative facts are roughly the kind of facts that go
to a jury in a jury case. Legislative facts do not usually concern the
immediate parties but are general facts which help the tribunal de-
cide questions of law and policy discretion. 24
In Bi-Metaliic, the principal issue concerned the general situation of
property owned by any taxpayer. Thus, legislative facts were at issue.
Conversely, in Londoner, the facts at issue were adjudicative because
they concerned each parcel of real property abutting the improvements,
and their relation to each other as such would affect the determination of
the proper assessments.25
22. Cf. Gart v. Cole, 263 F.2d 244 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 978 (1959). Prop-
erty owners and residents in the area affected by a slum redevelopment project of the City
of New York partially financed by federal funds under Title I of the Housing Act of 1949
were held not to be entitled to an oral hearing before the Federal Housing Administrator
on the feasibility of the City's relocation plan.
The impact of the determination was upon the group, not upon individuals, and as
would normally be the case in Title I proceedings, the number of residents affected by
the relocation proposals and therefore within the group is quite large.
263 F.2d at 251.
23. 239 U.S. at 446.
24. Facts pertaining to the parties and their businesses and activities, that is, adjudi-
cative facts, are intrinsically the kind of facts that ordinarily ought not to be deter-
mined without giving the parties a chance to know and to meet any evidence that may
be unfavorable to them, that is, without providing the parties an opportunity for trial.
The reason is that the parties know more about the facts concerning themselves and
their activities than anyone else is likely to know, and the parties are therefore in an
especially good position to rebut or explain evidence that bears upon adjudicative
facts. Yet people who are not necessarily parties, frequently the agencies and their
staffs, may often be the masters of legislative facts. Because the parties may often
have little or nothing to contribute to the development of legislative facts, the method
of trial often is not required for the determination of disputed issues about legislative
fact.
I K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.02 at 413 (1958).
25. See B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 202 (1976).
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In Landry, the plaintiffs were nine abutting property owners whose
assessments totaled about $20,000. Thus, as in Londoner, it seems evi-
dent that Landry concerned a relatively small number of persons who
were each exceptionally affected upon individual grounds. In
Londoner, the agency was not establishing a new rule, but was applying
the rule promulgated by the legislature to the factual situation of the
abutting property owners. Similarly, the Parish Council in Landry was
merely applying the provisions of the applicable street improvements
statutes as promulgated by the state legislature. The Parish Council was.
not concerned with a situation like that presented in Bi-Metallic, that is,
a determination that would affect all property in the parish. Such action
seems an exercise of judicial rather than legislative power and the rela-
tively few property owners who were adversely affected on individual
grounds should have been given an opportunity to be heard and present
evidence.
The element of applicability should serve as a key in differentiating
whether the Parish Council's benefits determination was the exercise of a
legislative or judicial function. According to Chief Justice Burger,
"[r]ulemaking is normally directed toward the formulation of require-
ments having a general application to all members of a broadly identifi-
able class."'26 Typically the legislative function of an administrative
body is directed at "situations," rather than particular persons. 27 How-
ever, if the agency action is directed at particular persons, the same right
to a hearing as in a proceeding which is clearly judicial in nature should
be afforded.28
Because of the "individual impact" upon the property owners, the
Parish Council's action involved an adjudicatory decision which should
not have been allowed to stand under the guise of a legislative act. It is
fundamental to our system of law that such adjudicatory action cannot
be validly taken by any judicial or administrative tribunal unless an op-
portunity to be heard has been afforded.29 The oldest established prin-
26. American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 359 F.2d 624, 636 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 843 (1966) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
27. Willapoint Oysters v. Ewing, 174 F.2d 676, 693 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S.
860 (1949).
28. [If the resulting administrative action, whether regarded as rule-making or
otherwise, is individual in impact .... a hearing preceding any final administrative
action is appropriate.
Appalachian Power Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 477 F.2d 495, 501 (4th Cir.
1973).
29. Philadelphia Co. v. SEC, 175 F.2d 808, 817 (D.C. Cir. 1948), vacated as moot, 337
U.S. 901 (1949). The adversary hearing tradition can be traced back to the earliest origins
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ciple in our administrative law is that "a party is not to suffer in person
or in purse without an opportunity of being heard."'30 This right to a
hearing includes not only the right to present evidence, but also a reason-
able opportunity to learn and to challenge the allegations of the oppos-
ing party. 3 1 Accordingly, the Supreme Court has traditionally insisted
that "an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is
deprived of any significant property interests."'32 Thus, the failure of the
Parish Council to afford an adversary hearing may have violated the
property owners' rights to due process. 33
The court further addressed itself to the plaintiffs' contention that
the Parish Council was without sufficient facts and information to make
the requisite determination of benefits. The court noted that the engi-
neer's report was in "less than comprehensive form" and that the council
did not receive any evidence that the lots to be assessed would be bene-
fited to an amount not less than the proposed special assessment. Nev-
ertheless, the court concluded that the council need not receive any
evidence of any kind when making its benefits determination. 34 Writing
for the majority, Justice Calogero further concluded that the determina-
tion may not be upset without evidence of a manifest abuse of power
of Anglo-American law. In 1723, an English judge traced this tradition back to divine law
itself. "Even God himself did not pass sentence upon Adam before he was called upon to
make his defense. Adam (says God) where art thou? Has thou not eaten of the tree,
whereof I commanded thee that thou shouldst not eat?" Rex v. University of Cambridge,
1 Str. 557, 567, 93 Eng. Rep. 698, 704 (K.B. 1723).
30. Painter v. Liverpool Gas Co., 3 Ad. & El. 433, il Eng. Rep. 478, 484 (K.B. 1836).
31. The right to submit argument implies the opportunity to challenge the allegations
of the opposing party; otherwise the right may be but a barren one. Those who are
brought into contest with the government in a quasi-judicial proceeding aimed at control of
their activities are entitled to be advised fairly of what the government proposes and to be
heard upon its proposals before it issues its final command. Morgan v. United States, 304
U.S. 1, 18-19 (1938). The opportunity to be heard must be provided at a meaningful time
and in a meaningful manner. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
32. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971). (Emphasis in original.)
33. Although many controversies have arisen because of the vague and abstract words
of the fourteenth amendment's due process clause, "there can be no doubt that at a mini-
mum they require that deprivation of. . . property by adjudication be preceded by notice
and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case." Mullane v. Central
Hanover Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
34. Further addressing itself to this point, the majority stated:
Although we find little merit in defendant's contention that the minutes of the council
are not subject to collateral attack, etc., we are equally satisfied that one may not
protest that a legislative body has not done that which through its exclusive means of
communication (resolutions and/or ordinances) it has proclaimed that it has.
352 So. 2d at 660.
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which exceeds the limits of legislative discretion.35 Even assuming for
purposes of discussion that the Parish Council's benefits determination
was, indeed, a legislative function, the conclusions of the court concern-
ing the applicable standard of judicial review should be examined to see
if they are consistent with established jurisprudence.
Louisiana jurisprudence has established that courts will review deci-
sions by an administrative body only to determine whether the hearing
was conducted in accordance with the authority and formalities of the
statute, whether the fact-findings of the body were supported by substan-
tial evidence, and whether the hearing body's conclusions from those
factual findings were arbitrary or constituted an abuse of the hearing
body's discretion. 36 A court may not interfere with this legislative func-
tion unless it is clearly shown that the legislative body's action is so
clearly arbitrary and capricious as to be unreasonable. 37 Equally well-
settled, however, is the rule that statutes conferring upon municipalities
the authority to impose local or special assessments are in derogation of
common rights and must be strictly construed.38 Municipal legislative
acts are presumed to be valid and the burden rests with the party attack-
ing the determination to prove that there was no substantial evidence for
the legislative action.39
Resolution Number 10,413 and Ordinance Number 4047 specifi-
cally state that the Parish Council made the required benefits determina-
tion. This determination is presumed valid and would have been
upheld upon judical review if there was "substantial evidence" to sup-
port the finding. However, the court in Landry did not examine
whether there was "substantial evidence" to support the Parish Council's
benefits determination, and instead concluded that courts may not upset
such a determination absent "manifest and palpable abuse of power."
Such language is, arguably, the manifest error rule in eloquent form, a
35. 352 So. 2d at 661.
36. See, e.g., Allen v. LaSalle Parish School Bd., 341 So. 2d 73 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ
refused, 343 So. 2d 203 (La. 1977); Stewart v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., 251 So.
2d 487 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971); Moffitt v. Calcasieu Parish School Bd., 179 So. 2d 537 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1965).
37. Butand v. Lake Charles, 338 So. 2d 358 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976); Olsen v. City of
Baton Rouge, 247 So. 2d 889 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ refused, 259 La. 755, 252 So. 2d 454
(1971); Hunter v. City of Shreveport, 216 So. 2d 140 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1968).
38. Bell v. City of Shreveport, 234 La. 607, 100 So. 2d (1958); Barber Asphalt Paving
Co. v. Watt, 51 La. Ann. 1345, 26 So. 70 (1899); Grambling v. City of Alexandria, 85 So. 2d
276 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1956).
39. See cases cited in note 36, supra.
19781 NOTES 1081
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
scope of review which should be distinguished from the substantial evi-
dence rule.
Substantial evidence has been defined as "such relevant evidence as
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."'40
The substantial evidence rule developed in the case law from the idea
that a finding of fact not supported by substantial evidence is beyond the
power of the administrative body.41 Application of the rule has caused
some difficulty. The reviewing court may not overturn a factual deter-
mination made by an administrative body if there is anything in the rec-
ord upon which reasonable men could base such a finding. Thus, under
the substantial evidence rule, the reviewing tribunal may, as a practical
matter, only concern itself with the presence in the record of a rational
basis for the conclusions of the administrative body and not with the
correctness of the administrative body's findings of fact. Review under
the substantial evidence rule is quite limited and the reviewing court is
precluded from disturbing findings of fact more frequently than under
the more flexible formulations of the manifest error rule.4 2
It is generally assumed that the manifest error rule permits stricter
scrutiny on review than the substantial evidence test, because the rule
evades definition, leaving its application dependent upon the individual
circumstances of each case. Matters of policy may affect the reviewing
court's judicial discretion, with the manifest error rule serving to limit or
to extend the scope of review. The scope of appellate review under the
manifest error doctrine may range from the narrowest review possible
under the "substantial evidence" test to the broadest possible under the
"clearly erroneous" test,43 depending upon the factual circumstances of
the decision under review."
Regardless of whether review of administrative findings is purport-
edly broader or narrower than "substantial evidence," prior to Landry it
40. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938).
41. The scope of review of a jury verdict is also usually stated in terms of the substan-
tial evidence rule. In NLRB v. Columbian Co., 306 U.S. 292, 300 (1939), the Supreme
Court equated substantial evidence with the amount of evidence sufficient to justify a trial
judge in sending the case to the jury rather than directing a verdict.
42. The substantial evidence rule is not applicable to the scope of review of findings of
fact made by a trial judge sitting without a jury. There the test is ordinarily whether the
finding is "clearly erroneous." This term has been defined as such error as to leave the
reviewing court "with definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed."
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).
43. Id.
44. See Comment, Appellate Review of Facts in Louisiana Civil Cases, 21 LA. L. REV.
402 (1961).
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was settled that a finding of fact by an administrative body would be
upheld upon a showing of supporting substantial evidence in the record.
The court's use in the instant case of manifest error terminology, instead
of a mere reference to the presence or absence of substantial evidence in
the record, might be seen as an effort to broaden the scope of judicial
review. Such an intention is, however, gravely doubted. It is suggested
that the court's refusal to follow the trend toward the substantial evi-
dence rule was because the Parish Council's record was without any evi-
dence to support the conclusion that the requisite benefit had accrued to
the adjacent property owners. 45 Had the court employed the substantial
evidence test, it could not have reached its conclusion. Yet by using
phrases apparently indicative of stricter scrutiny, the court was able to
uphold a finding insupportable even under the traditionally more per-
missive standard.
Some judicial review offact as well as law is essential if adminis-
trative bodies are to be kept within their designated authority. The law-
fact distinction is of crucial importance for present purposes, 46 since
there is no limitation on the power of the reviewing court to review con-
clusions of law. If a question of law is at issue, the court may substitute
its independent judgment for that of the administrator. The question of
sufficient evidence to justify the administrative body's findings of fact is
really a question of law,47 according to the leading case, Florida East
Coast Line v. United States.48  In treating the question of evidentiary
basis of fact-findings as a question of law, Chief Justice White stated:
45. The First Circuit Court of Appeal noted the parish's complete disregard of any
evidence at hand when it stated:
There is not one scintilla of evidence in this record that states that any given benefit
adds "X" dollars to the value of the properties sought to be assessed so that the sum
total of all of the benefits alleged to flow from all of the improvements equalls] the
amount of the assessment. All of the testimony offered by defendants is in general
terms. The language found in the resolution and the ordinance that a determination
was made is nothing more than a conclusion and does not satisfy the mandate of the
statute.
343 So. 2d at 214.
46. The law-fact distinction is one area in which the reviewing court subject to the
substantial evidence rule may enjoy an equal amount of discretion as under the manifest
error doctrine. K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 539 (2d ed. 1959).
47. See B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 25, at 591.
48. 234 U.S. 167 (1914). In Florida East Coast, the Interstate Commerce Commission
was faced with the question of reducing the rates of three railroads which ran through
Florida. The Commission reduced the rates of all three railroads although it had evidence
only showing reduced costs on two of the lines. The court set aside the ICC's order insofar
as it affected the third line because there was not sufficient evidence to justify that part of
the order.
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[I]t is undoubted that where it is contended that an order whose
enforcement is resisted was rendered without any evidence whatso-
ever to support it, the consideration of such a question involves not
an issue of fact, but one of law which it is the duty of the courts to
examine and decide. 49
Under the Florida East Coast approach, it is fairly easy to see that
the court in Landry could have substituted its judgment for that of the
Parish Council by regarding the question of sufficient evidence as one of
law. Just as the manifest error doctrine is capable of great flexibility, the
substitution. of judgment rule is, to a great extent, capable of judicial
manipulation as the individual appellate court might desire.50 In
Landry, the substitution of judgment doctrine could have been em-
ployed as a standard of review allowing consideration of the case de
novo.51 Such a standard of review would have permitted the reviewing
court completely to disregard the conclusions of the lower court. Thus,
the due process hearing, which was never afforded the plaintiffs, could
have been given at the stage of judicial review. Although a trial de novo
in the reviewing court is rare, it can take the place of the administrative
hearing.5 2
Another distinct problem with the Landry decision is the court's
statement that "one may not protest that a legislative body has not done
that which through its exclusive means of communication (resolutions
and/or ordinances) it has proclaimed that it has."' 53 Taken literally, this
would shield council minutes from collateral attack, or any attack, be-
cause they are the council's "exclusive means of communication." This
statement appears to mean that persons whose rights have been affected
by administrative decisions may not be entitled to judicial review of that
administrative determination. Moreover, the court's language is con-
trary to. certain Louisiana statutes, 54 which establish a rebuttable pre-
49. Id. at 185.
50. See Comment, supra note 44, at 411.
51. "Where the requisite due process hearing is not included in the ... administrative
process, it may be adequately supplied by ajudicial proceeding in which new evidence may
be supplied and full opportunity afforded for exploration of the basis of the disputed or-
der." Jordan v. American Eagle Fire Ins. Co., 169 F.2d 281, 289 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
52. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 25, at 209.
53. 352 So. 2d at 661.
54. LA. R.S. 13:3711 (1950) states:
Copies of any books, records, papers or other documents of any of the executive
and administrative departments, boards, and agencies of this state, and copies of any
books, records, papers, or other documents of any of the political corporations, bodies
politic, boards, departments and agencies of this state and the parishes and municipal-
ities thereof, when certified as being true copies by the official, officer or employee in
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sumption that the minutes containing such ordinances and resolutions
are valid. Furthermore, any finding by the court that all resolutions and
ordinances are to be taken at face value as valid and irrebuttable directly
conflicts with the state constitution. Article 1, section 22, of the Louisi-
ana Constitution of 1974 clearly provides that the courts must be open to
every person for adequate remedy by due process of law and certainly
preserves the presumption that all administrative determinations are re-
viewable by the court. 5"
whose custody they may be, shall be admitted in evidence in all courts of this state,
equally with the originals of such books, records, papers or other documents.
LA. R.S. 13:3712(A) (Supp. 1958) states:
Certified copies of books, records, papers or other documents provided in R.S.
13:3711 shall beprimafacieproof of the existence and contents of the originals and of
any act, transactions or occurrence or event as a memorandum of which said books,
records, papers or documents were kept or made. (Emphasis added.)
55. It is still not clear whether municipal and parish boards are exempt from the proce-
dural scheme established by the Louisiana Administrative Procedure Act, LA. R.S. 49:951 -
968 (Supp. 1966). The Act mandates compliance with procedural due process by all agen-
cies within its ambit of coverage. See Dakin, The Revised Model State Administrative Pro-
cedure Act-Critique and Commentary, 25 LA. L. REV. 799, 800 (1965).
LA. R.S. 49:951(2) (Supp. 1974) limits the scope of coverage of the Act to agencies
"authorized by law to make rules or to formulate and issue decisions and orders .... "
Municipal governing bodies have been described as "agencies" of the state by the Louisi-
ana Supreme Court. Bradford v. City of Shreveport, 387 So. 2d 487, 490 (La. 1975). See
LA. CONST. art. VI, § 44(2). Once a determination is made that an entity falls within the
intended defintion of "agency," the next inquiry concerns whether the agency is engaged in
the rule-making or the adjudication process. LA. R.S. 49:951(1) & (6) (Supp. 1966 &
1975). If the agency conduct concerns rule-making, the conduct is regulated by the Act's
rule-making provisions. LA. R.S. 49:953-954 (Supp. 1975 & 1976). If, on the other hand,
the agency action is classified as adjudication, an additional step must be taken to see if the
Act applies. If either a statutory provision mandates or a judicial determination demands
notice and hearing in accordance with due process, the Louisiana Act will apply to the
particular case. LA. R.S. 49:951(3) (Supp. 1966 & 1975); see Wong Yang Sung v. Mc-
Grath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950) (interpreting the Federal Administrative Procedure Act).
An argument for bringing municipal and parish boards under the force of the Act
would find support in the recent supreme court decision of Tafaro's Investment Co. v. Divi-
sion ofHousing Improvement, 261 La. 183, 259 So. 2d 59 (1972). In Tafaro, a New Orle-
ans city ordinance required notice and hearing to be afforded to property owners before
official repair of the owners' premises could be ordered at the owners' expense. The court
held that when an administrative agency adjudicates private property rights, the require-
ments of procedural due process must be observed, including a full evidentiary hearing
prior to entry of the order. Because the city ordinance required that notice and opportu-
nity for hearing be afforded, the argument for application of the Act seems compelling.
Likewise in a property assessment situation, such as in the instant case, LA. R.S. 33:3302
(1950) requires notice and hearing to be afforded. Thus, the same argument could be
applied.
Were the Act made applicable to municipal and parish boards, the scope of judicial
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If Landry is allowed to stand, it would mean that municipal and
parish governing bodies have a power possessed by no other officer or
administrative body, and may disregard the express mandate of the 1970
amendment to section 3306. As interpreted by the court, the challenged
statutory procedure permits a municipal or parish council to command
the levying of a special assessment when, in its own opinion, there is the
requisite benefit to the adjoining property owners. By sanctioning the
order allowing the levying of the special assessment, the court, in effect,
approved action taken without hearing, without evidence, without oral
argument, and without opportunity to learn the basis thereof. Since
such ex parte action was not deemed an abuse of the Parish Council's
power, some question arises over what the court would deem an abuse of
discretion or how this could be established in the absence of a hearing or
the opportunity to present evidence. The infirmities of this holding be-
come even more apparent upon realization that the administrative
body's findings are not subject to general judicial review. The adminis-
trator's opinion is final upon this fundamental question of requisite ben-
efits unless what the court denominates "manifest and palpable abuse of
power" can be shown to exist. Absent such a showing, the administra-
tive body may alone be cognizant of the reasoning behind its final opin-
ion to levy a special or local assessment. Such authority, however
beneficently exercised in one case, could amount to a finding by adminis-
trative fiat in another. Certainly, such authority is inconsistent with ra-
tional justice and invites the arbitrary exercise of power.
James Marshall Jones, Jr.
FOURTH AMENDMENT REMEDIES IN CIVIL PROCEEDINGS
On June 2, 1975, two detectives of the Jefferson Parish Sheriffs Of-
fice visited the defendant adult book store to obtain information to sup-
port a request for a search warrant. An affidavit signed by the officers
described by name various sexual activities depicted in the books and
movies displayed by the store. However, the search warrant which was
subsequently issued lacked the specificity necessary to give sufficient gui-
review of administrative determinations could be predicated upon expanded notions of
manifest error rather than the substantial evidence or the "arbitrary and capricious" stand-
ards. Where an administrative agency is not within the Act, reliance may only be placed
upon the limits of procedural due process. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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